We are still not ready

People’s Perspectives of Relief after the 2006 Yogyakarta Earthquake

Reality Check Approach Insights Study
Indonesia, 2017
The Reality Check Approach Insights study on People’s Perspectives of Relief after the 2006 Yogyakarta Earthquake has been made possible by the commitment of an enthusiastic team and the support of many others. The Reality Check Approach (RCA) was originally an initiative of the Swedish Embassy in Bangladesh where it was first commissioned in 2007 and has since been adopted in other countries and other contexts. This RCA Insights study is a component of a Needs Analysis for a contingency plan on disaster preparedness in Indonesia, led by the Indonesia Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). UNICEF – as a research partner – requested the support of the RCA+ team on behalf of the HCT. The data collection and analysis approaches were designed and undertaken by a team of local and international researchers (see Annex 1) with technical guidance from the RCA+ Project Technical Advisor. The dedication of the team members in taking part to this study and carrying out their work with professionalism, motivation, and respect for their host communities, is much appreciated.

Most importantly, this study was only possible thanks to the families, neighbours and communities who welcomed our researchers into their homes and shared their lives with them for a short while. We are grateful to them for this opportunity, and for openly sharing their lives, activities, perspectives and aspirations. We hope that the report reflects well their views and experiences and helps to make the programmes implemented in their name relevant and meaningful for them.

Disclaimer: The work is a product of the Reality Check Approach Plus (RCA+) team. The findings, interpretations and conclusions therein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of Indonesia, UNICEF or The Palladium Group.

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To request copies of the report or for more information, please contact the RCA+ team. The report is also available on the RCA website, www.reality-check-approach.com.

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<td>Camat</td>
<td>head of sub-district</td>
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<td><em>dapur umum</em></td>
<td>public kitchen</td>
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<td><strong>DIY</strong></td>
<td><em>Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta</em>, the Special Region of Yogyakarta</td>
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<tr>
<td>gedek</td>
<td>bamboo structure or semi-permanent house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gotong royong</td>
<td>the spirit of mutual cooperation, often seen as a key aspect of traditional village culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>kader posyandu</strong></td>
<td>village volunteers for the monthly infant and mother's check-ups held in villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kartu keluarga</td>
<td>family card, issued by the Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kecamatan</td>
<td>sub-district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kelurahan</td>
<td>the administrative unit below the sub-district office in cities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kepala desa</td>
<td>head of village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kepala dukuh</td>
<td>head of neighbourhood unit (unique to Bantul district)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kepala RT</td>
<td>head of neighbourhood unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nasi bungkus</td>
<td>wrapped meal of rice and one or more side dishes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>peyek</td>
<td>traditional fried cracker often made with peanuts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pengajian</td>
<td>Quran recitation/prayer group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POSKO</td>
<td><em>Pos Komando</em>, or Command Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pukesmas</td>
<td>public health clinic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCA</td>
<td>Reality Check Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGM</td>
<td>Universitas Gadjah Mada, a large public university in Yogyakarta</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUMMARY
RCA+ INSIGHTS STUDY ON PEOPLE’S PERCEPTIONS OF RELIEF AFTER THE 2006 YOGYAKARTA EARTHQUAKE

This Reality Check Approach (RCA) insights study was carried out in May 2017. The study was intended to gather retrospective insights from people in the greater Yogyakarta area on their perspectives and experiences of the post-earthquake relief effort after the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake. These insights will contribute to informing the development of a contingency planning exercise on disaster preparedness in Indonesia, which is being led by the Indonesia Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) through the Contingency Planning Working Group (CPWG). The RCA insights study is a component of the Needs Analysis and provides people-centered perspectives and experiences on post-disaster relief, particularly related to people’s key immediate needs.

RCA is an internationally recognised approach to qualitative research which involves highly trained and experienced researchers staying in people’s homes, joining in their everyday lives and chatting informally with all members of the family, their neighbours and others they come into contact with. This relaxed approach ensures that the power distances between researcher and study participants are minimised and provides enabling conditions for rich insights into people’s context and reality to emerge.

This insights study differs from a full RCA study in that it was conducted over a shorter timeframe (three nights compared to a typical four nights) over one round of fieldwork with a relatively small team of researchers, and that researchers contacted possible host families in advance. The study took place in eight locations in Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta (DIY), the Special Region of Yogyakarta. The research team had detailed conversations with over 150 people (82 men and 76 women) who experienced the 2006 earthquake in these communities.

Some implications from the study findings include that:

» The proactiveness of local community leaders is described by people as a key feature of the immediate relief effort and, in the longer run, also a determinant of how much aid a particular POSKO/area of a community received.

» People told us that after the Yogyakarta earthquake, kepala desa, and to some extent, kepala RT/dukuh played a relatively small role in their communities.

» In all locations with significant housing damage, people explained that outside help to clear rubble in the first few days after the earthquake was not always helpful because these people were often not careful to look out for valuables and in some cases people did not know when these volunteers might be coming.

» While people took practical approaches to the disposal of bodies, they said it is of important religious significance that bodies are cleaned and buried quickly and that the presence of dead bodies can also add to post-disaster trauma.

» Although there were some complaints about the main housing reconstruction assistance, none of the families we lived with said that they would have preferred to receive this money as untied cash.

» People described the establishment and

SUMMARY
management of POSKOs in DIY as being makeshift and haphazard. Simply based on Jakarta’s much higher density, POSKOs will need to have a much more systematic way of distributing aid.

» Many families shared that the perceived quality of the construction of their homes was very important to feeling comfortable and safe. However, there needs to be a greater assurance of safety standards during reconstruction efforts and better systems for sharing more standardised information related to this.

» Despite large amounts of aid from international NGOs and bilateral organizations, people told us that they didn’t know where almost all of the aid they received came from, with the exception of aid from relatives and through their networks.

» Housing reconstruction aid after the Yogyakarta earthquake was targeted towards those owning a home and required having a kartu keluarga. Such aid needs to also consider renters and landlords, particularly as Jakarta’s population in many areas is more transient with a large proportion of people renting.

» Additionally, there was no information provided to people about the capacity of health facilities following the earthquake. It would be useful to have some way to notify people about existing capacities and where they might be able to go for health needs.

» People want more emotional and psychological help. In addition to wanting more targeted help for adults, people shared that immediate relief efforts should also include help for people and children in dealing with the immediate trauma.

» The post-earthquake response in DIY saw a big influx of family, friends, and private individuals simply looking to help out in addition to the large amount of people working through official aid channels.

» People repeatedly spoke highly of the volunteers that came to their area. People also commonly shared that volunteers helped them deal with the trauma of the earthquake. However, this benefit provided to people in DIY by volunteers will need to be balanced with the denser urban environment of Jakarta.

» Although earthquake simulations have been done in many of the communities we stayed in since the 2006 earthquake, people are worried that these simulations won’t be useful. Most simulations and related initiatives like trainings and local response ‘units’ have also stopped in recent years.
BACKGROUND

On May 23, 2006 just before 6am, a 5.9 earthquake occurred some 20km south-southeast of Yogyakarta city. The earthquake impacted five districts within Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta (DIY), the Special Region of Yogyakarta and six districts within the neighbouring province of Central Java. Over 5,500 people were killed in the immediate aftermath. Over 350,000 homes were destroyed by the earthquake, with over half of these in the district of Bantul. Response from donors and international NGOs is considered to have been quick and extensive, with some 30 international organizations involved in the relief effort in addition to many bilateral donors. Some organisations were able to begin providing relief on the first day as they were already mobilized to respond to the potential eruption of nearby Mount Merapi, which had been active leading up to the earthquake. Many donors and organisations were also still providing assistance in Aceh after the tsunami which occurred there on December 26, 2004 and therefore already had post-disaster relief teams in country and some had remaining funding and supplies.

The Indonesia Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) is currently conducting a contingency planning exercise on disaster preparedness in Indonesia. To lead this process, a Contingency Planning Working Group (CPWG) was established, with planning focused on the scenario of a large-scale earthquake in Jakarta. The first two phases of the planning process for this contingency planning include a Disaster Impact Model and a Needs Analysis. The Needs Analysis is intended to: a) better understand and validate assumptions developed within the disaster impact scenario regarding communities’ expected vulnerabilities, risks, capacities and trends in preferences of assistance prior to a response; and b) to inform a common approach to the engagement with, and accountability to affected communities in the event of a large scale response where international assistance augments national capacities.

The Needs Analysis was carried out through a Pre-Crisis Community Perception Survey which primarily focused on attempting to better understand people’s key immediate needs (KIN) post-disaster. The Survey included key informant interviews (KII), four focus group discussions conducted in Jakarta, and this RCA Insights Study. This Insights Study in intended to help understand people’s KIN by listening to and learning from people who have themselves experienced a large earthquake in Indonesia. The study seeks to incorporate people’s own perceptions of needs, preferences, vulnerabilities and risks into earthquake preparedness measures in order for local, national and international responders to deliver a more robust initial disaster response, and for households to be better prepared themselves.

Since there have not been any recent large earthquakes in the greater Jakarta area, the planning for this study sought to identify a substitute location in Indonesia using the following as selection criteria:
Based on discussions with the CPWG, the Special Region of Yogyakarta (Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, DIY) was chosen for the study location with the intention to include different districts within DIY and a mix of urban/peri-urban communities.

**Structure of the Report**

The report begins with a brief overview of the RCA methodology, including adaptations made for this study and study limitations. Following this are the study findings, which are organized into four sections:

1. People’s Immediate Experiences and Needs
2. People’s Experience of Post-Disaster Assistance
3. Coping and Psychological Effects
4. Community Preparedness

At the end of each of these sections study implications are drawn from the in-depth conversations with people who experienced the Yogyakarta earthquake. As this report is meant to aid contingency planning for the Jakarta area, these implications also include relevant considerations for the Jakarta context. Unlike typical RCA reports, these implications extrapolate on the study findings and are presented from the viewpoint of the researchers and the study leader. Since the areas of Yogyakarta and Jakarta are admittedly quite different these implications are a speculative effort by the study team to assist the CPWG in contextualizing the findings within the Jakarta context.
METHODOLOGY
METHODOLOGY

This Insights Study used a specially modified Reality Check Approach (RCA) to gather insights into the perspectives of people in DIY on their experiences with post-disaster relief following the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake. RCA is a qualitative research approach which extends the tradition of listening studies and beneficiary assessments by combining elements of these approaches with actually living with people in their own homes. It can be likened to ‘light touch’ participant observation. The key elements of RCA are living with people in their own homes/places of residence rather than visiting and informal conversations which put people at ease. RCA also has the advantage of understanding lives in context rather than through project, programme or sectoral lenses. Taking place in people’s own space rather than in public or invited space means that power distances are reduced between the study participants and the researcher and the trust and informality that ensues creates an enabling environment for open disclosure.

This insights study differs from a conventional RCA study in a number of ways:

Duration of fieldwork – A full RCA study involves an immersion with the study families for a minimum of four nights. For this study, researchers spent three nights in communities living with study families.

Size of Study Team / Number of Households
A conventional RCA study normally involves 10 to 15 researchers doing at least two rounds of fieldwork where researchers stay in a different community each round. This typically results in 15 to 30 host households participating in a study. For this study, the team consisted of seven researchers doing one round of fieldwork. A total of 8 host households participated in this insights study.

Pre-visit – Although a RCA study does not normally screen locations or contact families in advance, it was felt that given the specific retrospective nature of the study, it would be more efficient to identify potential families ahead of time. Given that some researchers already knew someone acquainted with the family they lived with, additional emphasis was placed on reflecting on biases during the study briefing.

Interpretation of the findings – In presenting study findings, RCA typically and purposely eschews the ‘interpretation’ step in conventional framework analysis. This is done for a variety of reasons – most notably so that the findings are the voices of the study participants since they are the ‘experts’ of their own lives, experiences, and communities. However, as noted above, since this study is primarily intended to aid a contingency planning process for the Jakarta context, some interpretation has been done in the Implications for each section to provide some immediate and relevant notes for this alternate context.


3 See, for example, the recently published Adolescent Nutrition study conducted for UNICEF on www.reality-check-approach.com/Indonesia.html
**Study Locations**

This fieldwork for this study was conducted in May, 2017 in three areas around DIY (see table 1). Our team of researchers consisted of seven experienced RCA practitioners who stayed with seven families in the districts of Bantul, Sleman, and in Yogyakarta city. Using the research team’s local contacts in the Yogyakarta area, researchers identified possible study locations and families to live with a few days before the fieldwork began.

Over the course of the fieldwork, the research team chatted informally with all members of the family, their neighbours and other community members. In total they had insightful conversations with over 150 people (82 men and boys and 76 women and girls) who experienced the 2006 earthquake in these communities.

The Bantul locations included three peri-urban communities along with one semi-rural location which was still relatively close to the main road. The Sleman location is in the Berbah sub-district and is peri-urban, although houses are not particularly close to one another here. The Yogyakarta city locations are all urban - two are relatively close to each other in the old city area near the Sultan’s palace and one is towards the eastern part of the city. All locations have majority Muslim populations, with the Yogyakarta city locations more diverse than the others. The following table gives more details about the locations including information on homes that were destroyed by the earthquake and deaths, based on information shared by people in these communities. As evident in the table, Yogyakarta city was much less affected by the earthquake than the surrounding areas.

**Study Process**

RCA is not a theory based research method although it often generates people’s theories of change and contributes well to grounded theory approaches. It does not have a pre-determined set of research questions relying as it does on iterations from insights gathered in situ and building on a progressive series of conversations. However, as part of the briefing
### Table 1: Study Locations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location Code</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Home Density</th>
<th>Main Livelihoods</th>
<th>Homes destroyed</th>
<th>Deaths (in RT or village)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bantul light</td>
<td>Bantul</td>
<td>Semi-rural</td>
<td>Light</td>
<td>Farming, International migrants, Home industries</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>30 (village)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantul market</td>
<td>Bantul</td>
<td>Peri-urban</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Construction, Public service, Small trading, Livestock</td>
<td>Over 90%</td>
<td>13 (RT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantul peyek</td>
<td>Bantul</td>
<td>Peri-urban</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Farming, Construction, Home industries</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>5 (RT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantul hill</td>
<td>Bantul</td>
<td>Peri-urban</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Construction, Home industries, farming</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>17 (RT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berbah</td>
<td>Sleman</td>
<td>Peri-urban</td>
<td>Light</td>
<td>Farming, construction, factory workers</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>6 (RT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogya east</td>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Dense</td>
<td>Office work, public service, Small business</td>
<td>3 homes</td>
<td>3 (village)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogya central</td>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Dense</td>
<td>Office work, public service, Small business</td>
<td>3 homes</td>
<td>1 (RT)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
process for researchers, areas for conversations were developed to act as a guide to ensuring that conversations were purposive. The outcome of the deliberations with the research team are provided in Annex 2: Areas of Conversation.

Whilst researchers never take notes in front of people, they do jot down quotes and details as needed. Each sub team spent a full day de-briefing led by the study leader immediately after the completion of the field immersion. These sessions explored the areas of conversation (Annex 2) and required that researchers share their conversations, observations, and experiences related to these as well as expanding the areas of conversation based on people’s inputs. The de-briefers were asked to be vigilant about credibility and to test and critique researchers throughout the de-brief process.

The de-briefs were recorded in detail in written and coded de-brief notes combined with other important archived materials providing details on the people we stayed with and their communities. After reviewing all of the debriefing session notes, the study team met to identify the major themes emerging from the findings. A three stage process derived from conventional framework analysis was undertaken by three members of the study team and the technical advisor independently comprising:

- Familiarisation (immersion in the findings),
- Identification of themes (from the discussion with sub team leaders and from the data directly),
- Charting (finding emerging connections).

The independence of this activity is designed to test if the same themes would emerge. This is a key part of the analysis to add credibility and rigour. The key emerging narratives from these processes were used as a basis for the report writing. The conventional fourth step of the framework analysis is ‘interpretation,’ which is purposely eschewed in a conventional RCA study. As noted above however, for this insights study some interpretation has been done in an attempt to situate the findings more into the Jakarta context and aid the disaster contingency planning process. Quality assurance was carried out through internal peer review with special concern to ensure the research retained positionality of people themselves.

**Ethical Considerations**

RCA teams take ethical considerations very seriously especially considering the fact that studies involve living with people in their own homes. Like most ethnographic-based research, there is no intervention involved in RCA studies. At best, the study can be viewed as a way to empower study participants in that they are able to express themselves freely in their own space. Researchers are not covert but become ‘detached insiders.’ People are informed that this is a learning study and are never coerced into participation. As per the American Anthropological Association Code of Ethics, RCA adopts an ethical obligation to people ‘which (when necessary) supersedes the goal of seeking new knowledge.’ Researchers ‘do everything in their power to ensure that research does not harm the safety, dignity or privacy of the people with whom they conduct the research.’

All researchers were briefed on ethical considerations for this study and Child Protection Policies before their field visits (irrespective of whether they had previously gone through this). All researchers signed Code of Conduct on Confidentiality and Child Protection Policy declarations as part of their contracts. All data (written and visual) was coded to protect the identity of individuals, their families and communities. As a result the exact locations and identities of people are not revealed in this report. Researchers asked people’s verbal consent to be able to use their stories and insights, and assured people that they would keep their sharing off the records if they did not give their consent.

**Study Limitations**

As with any research, some limitations were encountered during the fieldwork including:

» As over 10 years have passed since the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake, people often could not recall specific details of what happened
and the processes and mechanisms related to the relief effort. People also spoke in more general timelines about when things happened. Due to this time gap, this study is also particularly susceptible to ‘recall bias,’ which is an intentional or unintentional recall of events which deviates from the truth. Humans’ ability to recall information through memory is influenced by a wide range of factors (most notably time) and is often imperfect. Recall of ‘significant or critical’ events are particularly subject to recall bias4, although the communal aspect of the earthquake may help aid in the retention of more general information.

Most families participating in the study were contacted in advance. This means that researchers were not able to make some of the usual contextual considerations when choosing a household, such as trying to stay with the poorest households or those without extensive personal networks. It also means that there may have been some additional bias, both from researchers and households themselves. During the study briefing, researchers were asked to reflect on the particular biases they might face given that many knew someone acquainted with their host household.

Although there are certainly similarities, Jakarta and Yogyakarta are still very different contexts. As with any research, caution should be used when extrapolating these findings to the Jakarta context. Additionally, the damage caused by the Yogyakarta earthquake centered primary on people’s homes, with private homes accounting for more than half of the USD 3.1 billion in damage5. The Disaster Impact Model prepared during this planning process is based on a 7.8 earthquake occurring in the Jakarta area, which would almost certainly result in more widespread issues such as heavily damaged roads or water infrastructure.

4 E. Hassan. ‘Recall Bias can be a Threat to Retrospective and Prospective Research Designs’. The Internet Journal of Epidemiology. 2005 Volume 3 Number 2
5 Preliminary Damage and Loss Assessment, Yogyakarta and Central Java Natural Disaster’. World Bank, 2006
The Setting

Table 2: Yogyakarta vs. Jakarta

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Population (2014)</th>
<th>Area (km)</th>
<th>Population Density (per km)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta</td>
<td>3,594,290</td>
<td>3,133.15</td>
<td>1,147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantul District</td>
<td>947,568</td>
<td>508.13</td>
<td>1,864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleman District</td>
<td>1,136,360</td>
<td>574.82</td>
<td>1,976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta City</td>
<td>404,003</td>
<td>32.50</td>
<td>12,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKI Jakarta</td>
<td>10,075,310</td>
<td>661.33</td>
<td>15,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Jakarta</td>
<td>1,729,444</td>
<td>146.66</td>
<td>11,792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Jakarta</td>
<td>910,381</td>
<td>48.13</td>
<td>18,915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Jakarta</td>
<td>2,430,410</td>
<td>129.54</td>
<td>18,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Jakarta</td>
<td>2,164,070</td>
<td>141.27</td>
<td>15,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Jakarta</td>
<td>2,817,994</td>
<td>188.03</td>
<td>14,987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thousand Islands</td>
<td>23,011</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>2,988</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note the table does not include the Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta (DIY) districts of Gunung Kidul and Kulon Progo, which were not visited as part of the study. Also note that population numbers for DIY in 2006 (based on 2005 estimates) are not significantly different than the 2014 estimates.
As Table 2 shows, Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta (DIY) is characterized by a dense urban area in the city of Yogyakarta with surrounding areas of much lower density. The districts of Kulon Progo and Gunung Kidul, not visited during the study, have even lower density levels. This is a stark contrast to the Jakarta area, where all five municipalities are at least as dense as Yogyakarta city itself.

In the 2006 earthquake, Yogyakarta city was not heavily affected. The hardest hit areas were Bantul district, along with some areas of Klaten district in Central Java. For this insights study, the study team stayed in four communities in Bantul, one in Sleman, and two in Yogyakarta city. We consider most of the Bantul and Sleman locations to be peri-urban, although Berbah (the Sleman location) and particularly Bantul light are more rural than the others. Overall, both major roads and those within these seven communities (paved and unpaved) sustained minimal damage from the earthquake. Water sources were damaged but people were generally still able to access (though more limited) what they regarded as ‘clean’ water. Most locations relied on wells, particularly for the first few days after the earthquake. In the Yogyakarta city locations and in Berbah, people were also able to access water from some public water taps near schools and cemeteries. Although many schools in the Berbah and Bantul locations collapsed, most health facilities remained standing and in operation (if overcapacity) following the earthquake. Electricity returned to the Yogyakarta city locations by the second or third days, but for the other locations it remained off for ‘about a month,’ with people relying on generators during this time. Mobile phone signal was lost soon after the earthquake and was down between one to three days depending on the location although most of ‘our’ families did not have working mobile phones at the time. Those in the Yogyakarta city locations had landlines which they said continued working after the earthquake.

3.1 People’s Immediate Experiences and Needs

As the earthquake occurred around 6am in the morning, many people said they were already awake and in some cases already outside of their homes. For those still indoors, they told us that their first response was to try and get out of their house. People described that in the initial panic in many cases it was only after getting outside that they tried to account for all members of the family. In two of the Bantul locations people explained that it was easy for their communities to account for missing people because ‘people know each other’ and since ‘we know who was in the houses the night before.’

Particularly for heavily damaged areas like the Bantul hill and Berbah locations, many people described the first hours as ‘people just wandering around [stunned]’ and that it was often difficult to recognize people because of all of the dust. Tensions remained high due to periodic aftershocks, which would continue throughout the day. Panic also quickly returned, as just two hours after the initial earthquake rumours of a tsunami spread rapidly by word-of-mouth in all of the locations. In Yogyakarta city, some people recalled men on motorbikes who wore black clothing telling people they needed to leave their areas because of a tsunami. In one of the Bantul locations, a father told us that he believes the rumours were started by the people living around a nearby river. He explained that during the earthquake the river

6 In 2008, BAKORNAS would become BNPB, the National Board for Disaster Management. BNPB is directly responsible to the President and its chairman is also appointed by the President.

water overflowed and that this made these people think that the water was coming from the ocean. Some people in Berbah shared a similar story about the tsunami rumour starting from the rising level of the river in the area. As these rumours spread people recalled that as others were panicking, they panicked as well and started to run ‘without thinking’ (see Box 3). People emphasized that images of the tsunami in Aceh (seen on TV) were still fresh in their minds. Many of ‘our’ families told us they tried to initially flee to the North mostly on foot but some, particularly in the city, on motorbikes. In one of the Bantul locations, most villagers ran up a nearby hill and despite a military officer telling people to come down later the first day, many said they stayed there for a week before heading back down to the village.

While two fathers in the Yogyakarta city locations told us that they quickly realized that it didn’t make sense for a tsunami to come so far inland, for many others they said they only turned back after hearing information from government officials. In three of the Bantul locations, ‘our’ families recalled that on the main road to the city they received information telling them that there was no tsunami warning. One family told us that there was a police officer on the main road telling people to go home because there was no tsunami and ‘there is going to be another earthquake.’ Another family said they

‘Tsunami or Volcano, I will die anyway’

I met a woman who recalled she heard about the tsunami rumour when she arrived at a hospital to try to get care for her husband who was struck by rubble during the earthquake. She said there was further confusion as people coming from the north were also screaming that Merapi was going to erupt. She told me she felt, confused and terrified, especially because the hospital was very crowded with patients and her husband had not been handled yet.

Although her husband had still not been seen by anyone, she recalled she heard some people telling her to run towards an open field not too far from the hospital. She panicked and ran to the open field where others had also gathered. She suddenly remembered her children back in the village and her husband who was still inside the hospital. She told me that, ‘At that moment, I took a very deep breath, and said to myself “No matter if it’s a tsunami or a volcano, I will die anyway.” So, I stopped running, and went back to the hospital to take care of my husband’.

Field Notes, Bantul light
were unsuccessfully trying to hail a ride north on the main road when ‘a car with a siren and megaphone’ came by yelling out to people that there was no tsunami. In Berbah, the Camat (sub-district head) eventually went around with a megaphone to tell people there was no tsunami. People said they didn’t question these announcements as they seemed to come from official parties. One of the fathers in Yogyakarta city recounted that he went around with the Kepala RT (head of neighbourhood) to try to convince people not to flee. While none of ‘our’ families in the city areas ended up fleeing, most students we talked to did try to flee north on motorbikes, only to get stuck in traffic jams.

People told us that the roads in and around their communities sustained minimal damage from the earthquake and that there were not any problems getting in and out of their communities after the earthquake. While people said that some water sources were affected, in all locations people said they were able to access water somewhere in the community. In Bantul hill, for the first few days many in the community were taking water from a single well which was undamaged with water that ‘did not turn yellow’ like many other wells.

While electricity returned in the first couple of days in Yogyakarta city, in the other locations it remained off for ‘about one month.’ People said that generators were very useful during this time, and some communities received these from ‘outside’ such as Bantul light. The majority of ‘our’ families did not have mobile phones at the time of the earthquake and although some in Bantul said that ‘the signal was out for three days,’ people did not describe this as a significant problem. In Yogyakarta city, some people who were university students at the time of the earthquake said that while there was still mobile phone signal ‘for about the first hour,’ it was then lost for the remainder of the day. Particularly for students coming from outside of the Yogyakarta area, they described the lack of signal as a much bigger problem, as it made contacting family and friends difficult and contributed to their family’s stress about whether or not they were safe.

Immediate Response

After the tsunami panic had subsided, people recollected that they began to ‘work together to help their communities.’ People told us immediate relief in communities came from, and was initiated by, community members themselves and not the village officials. Only in the Yogyakarta city locations did people say that the Kepala RT (head of the sub-village) helped initiate some of the immediate relief activities, whereas in Bantul hill and Berbah people told us that their Kepala RT/Dukuh were not particularly involved.

People shared that some of their most immediate activities involved clearing rubble to look for missing people along with cleaning the bodies of the deceased and burying them. For those that were badly injured, people described trying to get to health facilities on their own. They did not have any expectations of being helped with this beyond being able to share rides with others, such as one pregnant mother in Bantul market who walked her injured husband to the main road hoping to find someone to pick them up and take them to a hospital. Unable to find someone willing to stop, she walked her husband back to the nearby, but extremely overcrowded puskesmas (public health clinic). People in all locations shared stories about overcrowded health facilities in the immediate aftermath. Many described hospital beds being outside in open
lots while others described traveling from one hospital to another, hoping to find one that was less crowded.

People said that there weren’t any specific problems with illnesses in their communities following the earthquake. In some locations people told us that they received some medical relief within the first few days after the earthquake. In Bantul hill, people said that local health department workers came on the second day and provided simple medicines. In Yogya east, the local mosque’s health unit started organizing medical assistance like basic medicines on the first day. People recalled that in the following days this assistance also included having doctors available to visit people suffering from more serious issues.

While people recalled that they were not able to do ‘proper’ burials and often had to bury multiple bodies together, they shared it was important that they tried to observe their traditional burial practices as much as possible. One father in Yogyakarta city also told us that he felt it was important to quickly bury the dead so that people’s morale was not further affected, and that this would also help prevent the spread of diseases. In this location, burials were assisted by a group from the local mosque while in Bantul light, people said that the local hospital helped with burials.

As men said they mainly focused on burials and accounting for everyone in the village, women in many communities began to set up dapur umum (public kitchens) in the afternoon on the first day. Women described going back to their homes to collect pots, pans, and food items. In one of the Bantul locations, a dapur umum was quickly set up in front of one of the few still standing homes. The mother of this home, who we lived with, runs a small home peyek (traditional crackers) industry so had a lot of cooking utensils and equipment that could be used. In one of the Yogyakarta city locations, a father told us that many kiosk owners gave away much of their food stock both directly to people and for the dapur umum that were set up in the community.

People did not discuss using or needing any particular equipment to clear debris, but many said their areas received help with clearing debris (over the first week) from volunteers and in some cases, military officers. While people said that they appreciated these people coming in to help clear rubble, in many cases people said this was done too quickly and without care to look out for valuables and possessions of sentimental value. Some families described cases where officers and/or volunteers began clearing debris without informing the family first. Because of this, some told these people that they didn’t need help clearing debris because they preferred to do this on their own time when they could this more carefully, account for all of their belongings (including important documents) and take stock of things that might be able to be reused. In one village, ‘our’ family said that they used one of the few houses which didn’t collapse for storing people’s important documents.

‘People here quickly moved on because at that time we can still make peyek and sell everywhere’

(mother, Bantul peyek)

Temporary shelters were also set-up in all communities on the first day. People referred to these communal shelters as POSKO, Pos Komando or Command Post (see section 3.2 for more details). In all of our locations except those in Yogyakarta city, most people slept
in tarpaulin POSKO/tent shelters for at least the first week after the earthquake (many in Bantul market slept in the large market). For those whose homes had collapsed, most set-up tents/shelters at or in front of their homes once they received their own tarpaulin or tents. Many people shared that they wanted to stay near their own homes in order to protect their livestock and valuables and to try to preserve things which could be re-used. Although in Bantul hill many spent the first week up on top of the nearby hill, people said that some of the men in particular had gone down from the hill earlier so that they could stay there to watch over their homes. In most locations people said they had heard of instances of theft in other villages, although no one mentioned any big issues in their own village.

As people in these communities turned to relief efforts, most shared that they received updates about the situation in their area and around the greater Yogyakarta area through relatives and their personal networks. Many of ‘our’ families had relatives in other, less affected areas of DIY who frequently came to visit and help out. People said that these relatives would share news when they came to visit. Only in the Yogyakarta city location near the Sultan’s palace did people say that radio was an important source of information, although they did not turn to this immediately after the earthquake. Multiple families in this location shared that one station in particular, Sonora, provided frequent updates about the post-earthquake situation and the relief efforts in different areas of DIY. Sonora is a local radio station owned by Kompas Gramedia which people said usually plays music and that they really appreciated it focusing on local news during this time.

**IMPLICATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR JAKARTA**

As mentioned in the study limitations, Jakarta and Yogyakarta are very different contexts. Some people during this study also discussed what they perceive are big differences between their community and those in Jakarta such as: “If this [unequal aid distribution] happened in Jakarta, everyone would demonstrate but here we are passive” (Bantul market) and ‘I don’t think there is gotong royong [mutual community cooperation] in Jakarta’ (Yogyakarta central). Additionally, the majority of the damage from the Yogyakarta earthquake resulted from damage to people’s homes. As mentioned above, public infrastructure was not greatly affected, most notably roads which suffered little to no damage in all of the study locations. Water and sanitation problems were also generally not severe, and in the study locations no one we spoke with recalled any big issues related to water or sanitation. Still, despite likely differences between the Yogyakarta earthquake and the current planning scenario for Jakarta we have tried to relate the following implications to the Jakarta context when possible:

» **The proactiveness of local community leaders** is described by people as a key feature of the immediate relief effort and, in the longer run, also a determinant of how much aid a particular POSKO/area of a community received (see Section 2 for more). People also explained that, since ‘people know each other,’ it was easy to account for those who were missing immediately after the earthquake. Compared to Yogyakarta, Jakarta has more diverse and transient communities, including many non-traditional communities such as large apartment complexes which may not be able to rely on ‘local leaders’ to initiate and coordinate immediate relief efforts. These non-traditional communities would also pose greater challenges in identifying those missing, as people may not know each other. It will be opportune to consider what can be leveraged at the local level to help with immediate relief efforts in a post-earthquake Jakarta.

» People told us that after the Yogyakarta earthquake, kepala desa (village heads), and to some extent, kepala RT/dukuh played a relatively small role in their communities. However as mentioned in the above point, some areas of Jakarta may not be able to rely on ‘local leaders’ as was the case in the Yogyakarta earthquake. This suggest that kelurahan and kecamatan offices in Jakarta need to be more prepared, informed and able/willing to take the initiative post-disaster, at least with trying to manage the
establishment of temporary shelters, *dapur umum* and other needs such as rubble clearing and body cleaning/disposal.

» **People trusted information** (through megaphones or in person) in the first few hours after the earthquake from officials like *camat*, police and the military explaining that there was no tsunami danger. However, during the initial panic most people said they did not try to confirm the tsunami rumours after first hearing them, but simply reacted by trying to go north or get to higher ground. Now in an age of near-instant news and social media, rumours can spread even faster. While most certainly speculative, it may still prove useful to try and anticipate the type of false rumours that might spread in the event of a large earthquake in Jakarta. For example, it seems likely that, as suggested by people in some of the Yogyakarta city areas, some groups may use rumours to try to get people away from their homes in order to steal household goods. Strategies could be developed to pre-empt and help mitigate the spread of rumours, to quickly respond to rumours with mass information announcements, or methods developed to prepare communities for handling rumours themselves.

» In all locations with significant housing damage, **people explained that outside help to clear rubble in the first few days after the earthquake was not always helpful** because these people were often not careful to look out for valuables and in some cases people did not know when these volunteers might be coming. This is likely to be an important but difficult consideration for Jakarta, and it would be be useful to consider ways that aid can be provided in the immediate aftermath that helps people save or protect some of their valuables and key documents.

» People told us that the early morning timing of the earthquake mitigated the scale of human impact. Less people were on the roads, some were awake for prayer and children were not yet in school. It may therefore be useful to develop different contingency plans based on different times of the day. For example, a large earthquake in the middle of the night in Jakarta may present quite different challenges in the immediate aftermath compared to one that occurs around 6pm on a weekday when both roads and malls are typically crowded.

» While people took practical approaches to the disposal of bodies, they said it is of important religious significance that bodies are cleaned and buried quickly and the presence of dead bodies can also add to post-disaster trauma. Although Jakarta is more diverse than DIY it is likely that this will also be an important consideration for many people in Jakarta. In Jakarta there is also the additional challenges of more limited space and potentially a higher number of fatalities. Plans could therefore be developed within the scenarios with how to coordinate and manage the burial of fatalities.

### 3.2 People’s Experience of Post-Disaster Assistance

Most people said they were happy with the aid that they received and in some cases, quite surprised at the extent of this assistance. As shared by a mother in Bantul light, echoing others, ‘we are grateful because we didn’t necessarily expect aid.’ A widow in this community also told us that she felt receiving outside help was really important because after the earthquake it was mentally stressful for people and they were often too busy trying to worry about themselves and their own families to be able to help others. Particularly in the Bantul locations, some people shared that they had benefited from the earthquake, such as one family who said that, ‘everyone has become more successful’ (Bantul market).

The aid that people recalled most clearly was housing and food aid. Particularly in the Bantul hill and Berbah, people described the abundant levels of food aid as ‘overflowing with nasi bungkus’ (mother, Bantul market). In some locations, *nasi bungkus* arrived on the first evening ‘from somewhere’ although in one case a father said that this only came after he went out to try to find someone that
people (government or otherwise) what they most needed. However, people did not have any specific complaints about this and only in a few locations did people share that they did not receive something that was needed. In Bantul market for example, some people said that they could have used some kerosene lanterns in the first month before power came back but that no one provided these.

### Housing Assistance

People said the most prominent form of housing aid was cash assistance that had to be used for purchasing materials for home reconstruction. People explained that this aid was targeted towards those owning a home and with an Indonesian Kartu Keluarga (official family card). In the Bantul locations, people described two main types of this housing aid, one they referred to as ‘Pokmas’ and a second called ‘JRF’.

The Pokmas aid was much more common and in three of these locations people said that this aid was ‘from the government.’ Some felt that the JRF aid was not from the government and said that this aid was for those with a kartu keluarga but not yet their own home (e.g. younger family still living with grandparents). For most of the Bantul locations, people said the JRF aid came after Pokmas and that, unlike Pokmas, JRF would purchase materials for you and organise/hire labourers for building the house. Some also felt that the ‘JRF homes’ were better quality. Other than this, people did not know further specifics about these programs or the intended differences between them. In Berbah and the Yogyakarta city locations, people did not mention Pokmas or JRF but simply referred to ‘bantuan rumah’ (house assistance). In these locations, as for the Pokmas aid in Bantul, people could choose to hire workers to do the building or do it themselves. Many families said that they hired workers to do the majority of this work, although in all locations people said that good labourers were hard to find at the time because of the high demand.

In most locations, people said that this housing assistance first started to be dispersed at least four months after the earthquake (around October) but in two of the locations it did not arrive until the beginning of 2017. People shared that there were various forms of

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8 JRF is likely a reference to the Java Reconstruction Fund, a multi-donor fund led by Bappenas and managed by the World Bank.
temporary shelters in the meantime, including tarpaulin, tents (both large communal tents and smaller family-sized tents), and simple bamboo homes referred to in many locations as ‘gedek.’ Many people told us they liked the family tents, but some complained that they were too hot during the day and in some locations not all families received these. People said they liked the bamboo structures because they had good ventilation, however, in one of the Bantul location a family said they preferred the tents over the gedek because ‘it won’t hurt me [if it collapses].’

In all locations, people shared that they understood housing reconstruction aid involved three levels of assistance depending on the amount of damage to one’s home: collapsed, medium damage, and light damage. These different levels were determined by inspection surveys, sometimes done by village officials but in others done by regular citizens and in the case of Yogya east, a university engineering student. Some complained that these inspections were inconsistent and not thorough, and ‘our’ father in Yogya east said that, ‘it’s better if the inspection is done by someone from another village.’ People said that a collapsed home would receive IDR 15 million, while medium and light damaged homes received IDR 10 and 5 million respectively, although these amounts varied between the different locations. In one of the Bantul locations and in Berbah some people told us that from the IDR 15 million in reality they only received IDR 13.5 million because of ‘admin fees’ or ‘documentation.’ People said they were told they were supposed to receive a permit of some kind although until now ‘we’ve never received any certificate.’

Many people complained about the amount of money they received. People with collapsed homes in all locations told us that IDR 15 million was not enough to fully reconstruct their homes and that they had to use some of their own money. Many shared that the Vice President at the time, Jusuf Kalla, had ‘promised’ that the amount would be IDR 30 million (one person stated IDR 50 million), and this ‘promise’ people often referred to when discussing how insufficient the IDR 15 million was. In some locations, people recalled that for some whose homes had not collapsed, they tried to tear down their homes in the hope of getting IDR 30 million.

With IDR 15 million, many said that their reconstructed house had to be smaller than A ‘gedek’ house, built in some communities after the earthquake with the help of outside aid. These were generally meant to offer family’s shelter in the months after the earthquake until they were able to fully rebuild their homes. Although simple, most people said they liked the gedek because that they ‘can’t hurt you’ if there is another earthquake. Those that are still standing and/or haven’t replaced in communities like Bantul hill and Bantul market are often being used for storage.

A ‘Pokmas’ house. Many emphasized that the IDR 15 million that they received to rebuild their homes through this programme was not enough for a fully finished home, as can be seen here.
the home they previously had. This included a house we stayed in Bantul market, where the researcher had to sleep in the grandmother’s house next door as there was a lack of space in the reconstructed house. Other people shared that they were okay with the smaller size because, ‘We would rather have a tiny house that is stable and good quality’ [rather than a big house that is not stable]’ (family, Bantul market).

Many people discussed the need to have good quality construction so as to withstand future earthquakes, with a good, deep foundation, good bricks and using metal and chicken wire. However, although some people did mention buildings standards in some conversations such as receiving some specifications for Pokmas and JRF aid, there was no consistent understanding of standards nor consistent information that was distributed related to this. According to a local disaster relief specialist, a large team of facilitators was also supposed to help oversee the standards of reconstruction efforts. However, in our conversations with people no one mentioned facilitators related to housing reconstruction.

While many people said that the cash provided for housing assistance had to be used for the purchase of specific building materials, building ‘standards’ were only mentioned in two of the Yogyakarta city locations. In Bantul light, people talked about getting building help from a Japanese man and someone from Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM) but this was related to the construction of bamboo homes/shelters (see Box 6). People in one of the Yogyakarta city locations said that because they are within the Sultan’s palace grounds, they were required to have a ‘Kraton architect’ check their building plan. In another area, one father shared that there were some pamphlets developed which discussed building standards for reconstruction. He said he thought these were done by the government and that while they were helpful they weren’t distributed to everyone and not everyone knew about them. This father also told us that building material sellers provided lower grade materials for the same price during the reconstruction process (see Box 7).

Although unfortunately the team did not meet with any renters or local landlords during the

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**Box 6.** People in one of the Yogyakarta city locations said that because they are within the Sultan’s palace grounds, they were required to have a ‘Kraton architect’ check their building plan. In another area, one father shared that there were some pamphlets developed which discussed building standards for reconstruction. He said he thought these were done by the government and that while they were helpful they weren’t distributed to everyone and not everyone knew about them. This father also told us that building material sellers provided lower grade materials for the same price during the reconstruction process (see Box 7).

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**Box 7.** While many people said that the cash provided for housing assistance had to be used for the purchase of specific building materials, building ‘standards’ were only mentioned in two of the Yogyakarta city locations. In Bantul light, people talked about getting building help from a Japanese man and someone from Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM) but this was related to the construction of bamboo homes/shelters (see Box 6). People in one of the Yogyakarta city locations said that because they are within the Sultan’s palace grounds, they were required to have a ‘Kraton architect’ check their building plan. In another area, one father shared that there were some pamphlets developed which discussed building standards for reconstruction. He said he thought these were done by the government and that while they were helpful they weren’t distributed to everyone and not everyone knew about them. This father also told us that building material sellers provided lower grade materials for the same price during the reconstruction process (see Box 7).
fieldwork, no study participants mentioned housing aid for non-homeowners. This reflects findings from the RCA report following the Nepal Earthquake in 2015 which also found that renters were left out of some of the primary post-disaster assistance.

**POSKOs**

Temporary shelters, referred to as POSKOs, were also set-up in all communities on the first day. People said that the erection of the temporary shelters was mostly haphazard and that there was no system for how these were set-up. People recalled that proactive individuals in their community simply rounded up materials like tarpaulin and set these up. In almost all cases, people said that these shelters became, essentially by default, POSKOs. As aid from outside began to come into communities, POSKOs were also the de facto centres for aid collection and distribution. People told us that their villages had multiple POSKOs of varying sizes. In some cases like in Berbah, some of these were relatively small, with eight neighbouring households setting up small POSKOs together in different parts of the village.

Eventually certain, typically larger, POSKO in a community began to act as the main distribution centre and coordinator for aid. These POSKOs people often referred to as the ‘main POSKO.’ People described varying levels of involvement by the Kepala RT/Dukuh in the management of these main POSKO. While many people said that the Kepala RT/Dukuh was involved in the management/distribution of aid to some extent, in most cases this was described as nominal involvement. Often people said that the Kepala RT/Dukuh, or someone from his/her staff, were involved in managing record keeping and/or government aid, but that their role was limited beyond that. In the Yogyakarta city locations, people described the Kepala RT as being more involved in the management of aid compared to the other locations. People said that it was usually young men who distributed aid from POSKO to households and/or other smaller POSKO, and that it was also often men acting as coordinators at the POSKO themselves. In only a few cases people shared that women were involved in POSKO coordination (see Box 8), such as at the main POSKO in Berbah where a woman was one of the main coordinators. Only in Bantul market did people say that the POSKO coordinators (referred to here as a ‘committee’) were selected through voting. People shared that this would typically be ‘seven bapak-bapak (older men)’ although it would then be young men that distributed aid.

‘Usually those working [at the POSKO] take more [aid] but we already know this. It’s normal.’

(woman, Bantul light)

People explained that the location of a POSKO also determined how much aid that area might receive and the likelihood that incoming aid would be filtered through a POSKO or not, particularly in city locations. People told us that POSKOs that were located near the main road received more aid and were less likely to be bypassed. The amount of aid that people received they said was also determined by how proactive the POSKO coordinators were in looking for donors. As one very proactive father in Bantul light said, ‘The NGOs and donors are many but you have to knock on their doors.’ He recalled writing letters to different organisations and calling people he knew through his networks. Some people also told us about cases where POSKOs would be bypassed by someone looking to donate if it looked like that POSKO already had a lot of aid.

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8 Woman POSKO coordinator

People said that the head coordinator here was a friend of Pak Dukuh, but that he mainly handled record keeping. He also was not in the village at the time of the earthquake, and this woman said that she became the de facto coordinator at this POSKO simply because fellow villagers asked her to be. When asked why she thought people had ‘chosen’ her to do this, she only said that perhaps it is because she has been a long-time kader posyandu.

Field Notes, Berbah


10 As the RCA study on Hygiene and Nutrition (published in November, 2015) showed, kader posyandu, village volunteers for the monthly infant and mother check-ups held in villages, are often highly trusted members of a community.
**Fairness**

People shared that the differences in the amount of aid they received related mostly to a) the management of their POSKO (including issues of preferential treatment, proactiveness, and location), b) the location of their homes; and c) their personal networks. People often complained that POSKOs did not fairly distribute aid (including food and/or other goods) or simply did not distribute it quickly enough. Many people still told us that they accept this as the status quo and only in one location, Yogya east, did people frequently take their complaints to officials. In the other locations people told us that they didn’t know who to complain to, didn’t feel complaints would be addressed, and/or that it simply wasn’t in their nature to complain. One person explained this as ‘orang di sini diam-diam (people here are silent)’ (mother, Berbah) while another said that ‘if this happened in Jakarta, everyone would demonstrate but here we are passive’ (father, Bantul market). Previous RCA studies have also noted many people’s preference for not complaining, such as the report on the National Social Assistance Programmes\(^\text{11}\) which noted that:

‘People shared that they are reluctant to complain about social assistance partly because of the culture to avoid confrontation and respect authority but also because they fear they may not get benefits in the future if they do’ (page viii).

‘We couldn’t handle the amount of stuff’

‘My’ father was initially on the ‘committee’ for one of the POSKO in the village but after a week he recalled, ‘we couldn’t handle the amount of stuff and kept getting complaints.’ He said that, ‘my area is kind of lazy,’ explaining that in his brother’s village further to the south people weren’t relying on outside help and just got back to work on their own, but in his city neighbourhood a lot of people complain. After the first week, he told me, they turned the POSKO coordination over to the Kepala RT and his staff but that ‘it was still too much so they asked the Camat for help.’ Eventually, the Camat’s office developed a ticketing system for managing their aid. He explained that aid to the neighbourhood was directed to the Camat’s office. Certain people could then go to the Camat’s office to get a ticket which could be used to pick up goods at markets like Beringharjo. He said that while this didn’t solve all of the problems, ‘it’s better if the government handles it because people don’t have high expectations from the government and won’t complain as much.’

Field Notes, Yogya east

‘It’s better if the government handles it because people don’t have high expectations from the government and won’t complain as much’

(father, Yogya east)

In some locations like Berbah and Bantul light, people said that it was the less proactive POSKOs that caused more problems related to fairness. A father in Bantul light said that if a POSKO was ‘passive’ about what to do with the aid, ‘this creates chaos’ because more people may be left out and some will be frustrated or try to obtain aid independently and not working together as a community. Sometimes this was in the name of fairness, such as some POSKOs which people said waited to distribute aid until there was enough for everyone. In Bantul hill, some people said that their Kepala Dukuh who they explained was nominally in charge of the POSKO was ‘too slow to advocate for our village.’ Many people also shared stories of POSKOs being bypassed by donors when it appeared that they already had a lot of aid.

**Depends on your luck, if you have a bad [Kepala] RT you’re screwed’**

(Bantul market)

Similar to the POSKOs themselves, some people shared that those with homes nearby to main roads were more likely to receive more aid as sometimes donors (mostly private individuals but sometimes organisations) would simply drop off items at the side of the road. In many locations people recalled that some simply waited alongside main roads trying to get aid (money and/or goods) from cars passing by. In Bantul market people said that once you moved back to a tent near your home you were often left out of aid distribution so that you would have to go to the POSKO on your own initiative.

People also told us that their personal networks distinguished who was better supported or not.

\(^{11}\) ‘People’s Views and Experience of the National Social Assistance Programmes’. Reality Check Approach Report, 2015.
Two women in Bantul market said that they were ‘doing better’ than some because they received money from a relative who lived outside of the area. People said that those with connections to government offices and universities also often received additional assistance. For example, some families with children attending universities like UGM received aid packages from the university in the first week after the earthquake.

Aid Sources
People described getting a significant amount of aid from relatives and their personal networks, mostly in the form of food, goods and money. People said that they often received money by hand ‘in envelopes’ but also sometimes through bank transfers. In Bantul light one of the locals in a nearby village was working in Turkey at the time and people said that this person was able to help obtain housing aid that covered over 100 houses in this nearby village (see Box 5 earlier). People told us that aid from private individuals often went directly to individual families but that POSKOs would try to direct this aid through them as well.

‘We don’t know who the aid is from anyway’
(mother, Bantul light)

Besides aid that came through personal networks, people across all of the locations shared that in general they didn’t know the source of the aid they received. For example, despite around 30% of all temporary shelter assistance being provided by Palang Merah Indonesia12 (PMI), the Indonesian Red Cross Society, PMI was only mentioned by name in one of the locations we stayed in. In this location, people told us that PMI had given tents for individual families which people could set-up in front of their homes. However, people told us that these tents were only given to families with elderly people and young children, and some said that they wished that these could have been for everyone.

All of the locations we stayed in are predominantly Muslim. Unlike most other aid from outside sources people explained that they were sometimes aware of aid that came from religious organizations, although they didn’t know specific names. Some people shared that they were suspicious of aid coming from Christian organizations, although we spoke to many who also felt that such suspicions were unfounded (see Box 9). In Yogyakarta city, while one person said that aid from Christian organizations mostly goes just to Christians one man at a pengajian (Quran recitation group) here told the researcher that he received aid from a Christian organization - ‘I am the proof that the church even helps me.’ ‘Our’ father here explained that he doesn’t think that people are actually reluctant to accept aid from certain groups or religions, but that ‘it’s more about envy.’

Suspicions with aid from churches
In Berbah, the woman POSKO coordinator said that aid from a Christian organization was the first aid to come to their community. The organization brought nasi bungkus on the first day and came back at other times with food and nurses who provided medical assistance. She liked that they never ‘passed up’ her POSKO ‘like some other organizations would do.’ She said that a pastor from this organization also came and helped with counseling. Some were particularly suspicious about this being part of some kind of ‘Christianisation,’ she explained, but that she felt he didn’t have any bad intentions. In Bantul market, people said that some men from an ‘English Church’ came and offered to build some houses but people worried about this being part of an attempt at converting them. People here explained that it would have been better if this organization had talked to people from the local mosques first.

In a few cases, people also described being somewhat skeptical of aid that might be related to political interests. The proactive father in Bantul light was at the time quite involved in one of the political parties. While people in his own community were not skeptical about the intentions behind his efforts to help obtain aid, an attempt later on by the father to provide aid to a neighbouring community was refused because of concerns about his political intentions.

Although people shared that they did not know the exact source of the aid they received from outside sources, they described clear differences

12 According to a local disaster specialist who was involved in the relief effort
in their expectations and their perception of quality with private aid (from individuals and organisations) compared to aid they perceived was from the Indonesian government. In all locations people said that when it comes to assistance from the government you can’t have high expectations. In Bantul hill, people also emphasized that besides some people from the local health department, ‘the government came too late’ compared to aid from other sources.

‘If it’s from the government you’re definitely not going to get the full amount. That’s how it is. If private it’s not like that’

(mother, Bantul market)

Health and Education

While people in all locations told us about overcrowded and overflowing hospitals and clinics in the immediate aftermath, people did not have any specific complaints about their access to health services or the capacity of these facilities. In some locations people did complain about problems with information sharing that led them to pay for health services that they said should have been free. One mother in Berbah shared that her son was hospitalized on and off in the first few months after the earthquake with bronchitis. She was paying for this treatment, but said she found out later that she could have received free treatment in public hospitals.

In the Bantul locations and in Berbah, most of the local schools collapsed. People explained that school first resumed underneath large tents anywhere between two weeks to one month after the earthquake. Some told us that because the tents needed to be shared by multiple classes/grades, classes often had to take turns and that school days were shorter. Although families said that their children faced boredom in the weeks following the earthquake, people did not specifically highlight the role that school, or a lack thereof, played in this. In two locations, Yogya east and Berbah, people said that they received toys for their children and that these were ‘really helpful’ in helping children deal with boredom.

IMPLICATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR JAKARTA

» The ‘broken promise’ by the Vice President Jusuf Kalla seems to have influenced how people think about the sufficiency of the housing reconstruction money. Although international organizations may not have any control over such announcements by the Indonesian government, it still provides a lesson of caution in making promises before relief plans are confirmed and/or more information from the site of a disaster is received. For example, it is our understanding the Jusuf Kalla’s reference to IDR 30 million came at a time when quick counts by local government staff soon after the earthquake had greatly underestimated the number of heavily damaged homes.

» Although there were some complaints about the main housing reconstruction assistance, none of the families we lived with said that they would have preferred to receive this money as cash that could have been used for whatever they wanted/needed. Researchers did hear of one woman who tried to receive the housing money as untied cash, but people did not know why the woman preferred this. The lack of a preference for untied cash may relate to the fact that many people were getting cash from relatives and their personal networks and that many also received large amounts of other goods. Some locations mentioned receiving IDR 90,000/person from the government over a period of four months, and one father said that, ‘I saved this money because there is already so much food.’

» People described the establishment and management of POSKOs in DIY as being makeshift and haphazard. In the more densely populated Jakarta there will be less open spaces that could be utilized for establishing the POSKOs. It will therefore be even more imperative that the establishment and management of POSKOs is better planned and organized. At the very least, communities should have designated areas that they know could be used for the erection of temporary shelters. Some flood prone areas of Jakarta
may already have such areas through past experiences with being forced from their homes, but many areas would not have identified designated areas.

» Simply based on Jakarta’s much higher density, **POSKOs will need to have a much more systematic way of distributing aid.** This includes being ready for large amounts of aid from private individuals, which people we spoke with who had worked at POSKOs said is more difficult to report and manage. Help could also be provided to manage this influx of aid from private individuals. The ticketing system developed in one of the Yogyakarta city locations provides an example of a potential model of a more systematic, but government-managed POSKO process. Still, this system did not appear to address one of the main contributors to the complaints in this area in the first place, distribution. The system also relied on being able to travel to a distribution center.

» People in many locations emphasized that **proactive POSKOs received more aid, and people had better perceptions of the management of these POSKOs.** It would be helpful to have a way to help ensure that less active POSKOs are still accounted for and serviced. Additionally, as the location of a POSKO also appears to have been important particularly in Yogyakarta city where populations are denser, communities in Jakarta may need to consider this as part of their own contingency planning.

» Many families shared that the perceived **quality of the construction of their homes was very important to feeling comfortable and safe.** This was particularly reflected by people who described being happy with their new homes, despite the smaller size, because they felt it is safer. However many questions remain regarding the actual quality of reconstructed homes, particularly given the lack of consistent information or understanding about buildings standards and the seeming absence of quality assurance, despite facilitators apparently being designated for this work. **There needs to be a greater assurance of safety standards during reconstruction efforts** and better systems for sharing more standardised information related to this.

» Despite large amounts of aid from international NGOs and bilateral organizations, **people told us that they didn’t know where almost all of the aid they received came from,** with the exception of aid from relatives and through their networks. In one location, efforts to put up branded banners weeks after the disaster were met with some skepticism and disdain by people. Donors looking for more recognition in a possible Jakarta disaster will need to be tactful in the ways that this is done.

» People said they were much more aware of aid coming from religious organizations. People in different locations shared suspicions about aid from Christian organizations, and there were some indications that people were also wary about possible political intentions behind aid. With a more politicized environment in Jakarta, and given recent tensions related to the case against former Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, aid from religious and/or politically-oriented groups will need to be managed carefully. This should include branding considerations, as noted above. Based on suggestions from people in DIY, it will be helpful if such organizations make their intentions known and transparent in the communities they plan to operate in; involve those groups with influence in these communities; and be cautious about perceived preferential treatment for those with similar views/beliefs.

» While people did not share particular complaints with local health and education services in the aftermath of the earthquake, it seems that at least some of this relates to people’s low expectations about these services and their capability. In particular people repeatedly described their low expectations for any government-related response to the earthquake. In addition to grievance mechanisms that people feel will be useful and that they will be comfortable using related to the management of
3.3 Coping and Psychological Effects

‘After the earthquake people were asking for “Decolgen” and “Antimo” to help them sleep’

(father, Yogya east)

People in all locations shared that dealing with psychological trauma is the key need which they wish could have been more addressed by the relief effort. Although people shared many appreciative stories about individuals and volunteers who came to talk to and play with children, many said that more of this was needed. Parents and adults also emphasized that they need support as well to help deal with the trauma of the earthquake and that

How ‘my’ family coped, and is still coping, with the earthquake

‘My’ father said that keeping busy helped him deal with the stress following the earthquake. He helped with security rounds in the evenings and said it was really nice on the second day when the power came back on because he could watch the World Cup with his friends. ‘This was a big help,’ he told me, smiling. The memory of the earthquake is still strong. Father still helps sometimes with the nightly security rounds and said that he often has trouble sleeping after the gets back from the rounds because ‘it’s usually around the time the earthquake happened.’ Grandma told me that likes to keep a glass of water sitting out on the table ‘so that it’s easy to see if there is any shaking.’ She also prefers to lock doors with latches rather than with keys, because she worries about getting key locks open in case of another earthquake.

Field Notes, Yogya east

A wall from this family’s previous home which was destroyed during the earthquake. The father said they’ve kept it as a ‘memory’.

This family’s TV cracked during the earthquake but still works. They have written on the date of the earthquake as a ‘reminder’.

POSKOs, similar mechanisms for health and education facilities/services may prove useful as well.

Additionally, there was no information provided to people about the capacity of health facilities following the earthquake. People repeatedly described driving from one hospital to another, trying to find one that wasn’t well beyond capacity. It would be useful to have some way to notify people about existing capacities and where they might be able to go for health needs.

Housing reconstruction aid after the Yogyakarta earthquake was targeted towards those owning a home and required having a Kartu Keluarga. As other RCA studies like the Child Poverty and Social Protection study13 have shown, some families, and particularly those in urban slum areas, do not have Kartu Keluarga. It would appear that non-homeowners like renters and local landlords were left out of this assistance. In Jakarta this could be a particularly important issue to tackle as the population in many areas is more transient with a large proportion of people renting.

such support was rarely targeted towards them. People did not describe any particularly vulnerable groups, however, and some felt that ‘we’re all vulnerable’ (family, Bantul market).

‘We need more mentors for the children. It’s hard for us to explain things to them because we are also victims’

(Grandma, Yogya city)

People across all locations shared a lot of appreciation for volunteers that came into their communities after the earthquake, with some exception for those helping with rubble clearing efforts in the first week as mentioned earlier. Some described periods when their villages had many volunteers and relatives around and they were happy about this. In Bantul market, a woman happily recalled that at times it was, ‘crowded like during Eid’ while a man here said that, ‘I’d never seen so many people together’ when the village had a pengajian out in the open after the first month. Although people said that volunteers helped with relief tasks, the main reason they liked the volunteers was simply because they were someone else to talk to, to share with, and to take their mind off of the current circumstances. A teenager in Bantul shared that it was volunteers that helped motivate her to continue her studies after her parents died in the earthquake. Some people shared that since they didn’t know who to complain to about issues like aid distribution, they would also share these complaints with volunteers. People said that these volunteers included many university students. According to some, students were also able to change their KKN\textsuperscript{14} location to the DIY area to be able to help with the relief effort.

People also shared that the awareness that many others outside of their village were also affected by the earthquake was important for coping with some of the initial trauma. Many shared stories about walking to main roads in the immediate aftermath and being amazed and startled by all of the injured, ‘bloody’ people on the roads. In one of the Yogyakarta city locations, a mother whose house was one of only a few in the neighbourhood to collapse shared that she felt very confused after the earthquake because it felt like her family had been targeted. However, after she saw injured people on the roads trying to make it to hospitals and learned in the next few days about the destruction in other parts of DIY over the radio, she didn’t feel alone.

\textbf{Box 11 - A father’s trauma}

‘Bapak was very quiet and not talking much,’ ‘my’ mother told me about her husband’s condition after the earthquake. She said that he got easily stressed, didn’t like loud noises and would sleep outside of the tents during the night. ‘In the beginning, I thought maybe Bapak missed his cigarettes so I asked my son-in-law to go to the city to buy the kind he likes (Djie samsoe 234). But he was still quiet and it was already one week after the earthquake.’

Mom said that when her oldest daughter arrived back from out of town, she asked her what she thought about the father’s condition. Her daughter said she didn’t know, but decided to move back to the village for the time being to help with the recovery process. ‘I was so happy when she made that decision,’ said mom.

‘Then,’ said mom, ‘we remembered about Bapak’s friend in the city. He is a spiritual man and we contacted him and told him about Bapak’s condition. He said he would like to bring Bapak to his house in Yogyakarta.’ She said that this friend came to the village and that Bapak agreed to go stay with him for a while.

‘After about one week, Bapak came home. He was doing better but it took a long time before he was himself again. For almost one year he still didn’t want to sleep under a roof.’

Field Notes, Bantul hill

\textbf{Do not scream}

People told me that a woman in my village continued to sleep outside her house for nearly a year after her house was rebuilt because she was still too terrified to sleep indoors. ‘Whenever there is any earthquake now or very loud noises, she is the first to run out of her house and scream for help,’ said a villager. People said that everyone here has an unwritten agreement that no one around her should scream as it could worsen her emotional state.

Field Notes, Bantul market

\textsuperscript{14} Kuliah Kerja Nyata, or KKN, is a community service programme which university students participate in typically during their final semester. KKN is often undertaken in more rural areas outside of a university’s own location.
IMPLICATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR JAKARTA

» People want more emotional and psychological help. In addition to wanting more targeted help for adults, people shared that immediate relief efforts should also include help for people and children in dealing with the immediate trauma.

» The post-earthquake response in DIY saw a big influx of family, friends, and private individuals simply looking to help out in addition to the large amount of people working through official aid channels. Given the density of Jakarta and the likely more serious access issues, it would be prudent to have some way of anticipating, managing, and potentially mitigating such an influx of people from outside of the Jakarta area in the event of a large-scale earthquake.

» People repeatedly spoke highly of the volunteers that came to their area. People also commonly shared that volunteers helped them deal with the trauma of the earthquake, even if the volunteers weren’t there to provide counseling or psychological help. However, this clear benefit provided to people in DIY by volunteers will need to be balanced with the denser urban environment of Jakarta. Considering the potential for an influx of outsiders only adding to the burden of the response in a Jakarta earthquake, local universities in particular (for those not heavily damaged themselves) may be able to play a key role in volunteer response.

3.4 Community Preparedness

People in some of the locations told us that in the years directly following the earthquake there were simulations done in their communities about what to do in the event of another earthquake although these have since stopped and people didn’t mention any specific practices gained from these simulations. Irrespective, people shared that if another large earthquake happens they will probably ‘still just panic and run’ (Bantul light) or that ‘people admit they are still not ready’ (father, Yogya east). In one of the Yogyakarta city locations, people said that the year after the earthquake the Kecamatan office created a disaster response team called Unit Reaksi Cepat (Quick Reaction Unit) although people did not know if this was still active. Three people in this village were also selected to receive training on post-disaster assistance like first aid from the National Disaster Agency and the National Search and Rescue Agency but people said this training stopped in 2013.

In Bantul hill, people said that the community held a ‘social reconciliation event’ around a year after the earthquake because ‘people realize that there was some jealousy in the community’ which had affected community dynamics. Some people shared stories during this event and village leaders emphasized that ‘people should forget about any conflicts.’ ‘Our host household in this location shared that some frustrations still exist but that they still appreciated the event. In Bantul market, people said that every year they watch a documentary outdoors in one of the fields nearby ‘to commemorate the earthquake.’
Beyond these initiatives and events, people did not talk about any other efforts in their communities to discuss lessons from the 2006 earthquake or make plans for possible future earthquakes. One of ‘our’ fathers in Yogyakarta who was quite active in his community during the relief effort said that he took ‘mental notes’ in the months following the earthquake about who and what were most helpful to help if a big earthquake happens again, but these are notes for himself ‘so I can help handle the situation better.’

**IMPLICATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR JAKARTA**

Although earthquake simulations have been done in many of the communities we stayed in since the 2006 earthquake, people are worried that these simulations won’t be useful. Most simulations and related initiatives like trainings and local response ‘units’ have also stopped in recent years. Preparedness efforts for Jakarta may need to consider alternative initiatives. It may also be useful to get details on the processes used for the simulations done in DIY communities, as there may be some clear areas where improvements could be made.
STUDY IMPLICATIONS

Summary of key implications

- **The proactiveness of local community leaders** is described by people as a key feature of the immediate relief effort and, in the longer run, also a determinant of how much aid a particular POSKO/area of a community received.

- People told us that after the Yogyakarta earthquake, *kepala desa*, and to some extent, *kepala RT/dukuh* played a relatively small role in their communities.

- In all locations with significant housing damage, **people explained that outside help to clear rubble in the first few days after the earthquake was not always helpful** because these people were often not careful to look out for valuables and in some cases people did not know when these volunteers might be coming.

- Although there were some complaints about the main housing reconstruction assistance, **none of the families we lived with said that they would have preferred to receive this money as untied cash.**

- People described **the establishment and management of POSKOs in DIY as being makeshift and haphazard.**

- Despite large amounts of aid from international NGOs and bilateral organizations, **people told us that they didn’t know where almost all of the aid they received came from.**

- Housing reconstruction aid after the Yogyakarta earthquake was targeted towards those owning a home and required having a *kartu keluarga*.

- There was no information provided to people about the capacity of health facilities following the earthquake.

- **People want more emotional and psychological help.** In addition to wanting more targeted help for adults, people shared that immediate relief efforts should also include help for people and children in dealing with the immediate trauma.

- People repeatedly spoke highly of the volunteers that came to their area. People also commonly shared that **volunteers helped them deal with the trauma of the earthquake.**

- Although earthquake simulations have been done in many of the communities we stayed in since the 2006 earthquake, people are worried that these simulations won’t be useful.
ANNEX 1: STUDY TEAM

TEAM LEADER
Steven Ellis

STUDY CO-LEAD
Sherria Ayuandini

TECHNICAL ADVISOR
Dee Jupp

RESEARCH TEAM MEMBERS

BANTUL
Invi Atmanegara
Antonius Maria Indrianto
Siti Alifah Ahyar
Thalia Shelyndra

SLEMAN
Zakiyah Derajat

YOGYAKARTA CITY
Steven Ellis
Rudi Yudho Sartono
ANNEX 2: AREAS OF CONVERSATIONS

Experience of the earthquake
Story of what happened including time, place, activities when earthquake happened
Immediate responses to earthquake including feelings and emotions, actions taken
Narrative of the aftermath including series of events experienced, emotions, actions, etc.
Stories related to family members such as the immediate impact of earthquake to them, feelings and actions related to family member's situation
Exploring key moments including narrative about important happenings
Explanations of earthquake such as people's reasoning why the earthquake happened and the place where it struck
Immediate relief and emergency service including the type, timing, functionality, usefulness, etc.
Effect on indiv. livelihoods, public life, village dynamics, social life
Effect on public services including communication and road access
Media's role in the immediate aftermath

Experience of aid/relief
Own direct experience
Provisions made for family members
Aid received including source organizations/government, civil society, individuals, type (incl. physical vs psychological), functionality, coordination
Quality of aid including expectations, acceptability, good/bad experience, timeliness/duration
Organization and distribution of aid including coordination, dissemination, duplication
Mechanisms incl. process, legibility/requirements
Initiatives done by individuals/groups/organizations
Things missing which would have helped

Accountability
Key actors of the earthquake aftermath including parties to share responsibility and/or blame and reasons for it
Information source including the first point of contact, source of information, mechanisms in place, sources to be trusted or not trusted
Mitigations/risk reduction including responsible parties, process considered to be adequate
Government including its expected role, its actual role based on people's perception
People's understanding of aid and relief
Community and family: their expected roles, their actual roles based on people's perceptions, etc.
Perception of fairness in aid including exclusions or missing out and people's reasoning
Grievance mechanism and transparency

Coping and adaptation
Family level including decision making in the family, choices available in the aftermath such as migrating/staying, children caring practices, change in dependency vs. independency (cash, food, shelter, clothing, medical), change in daily life, disruption to routine, spaces, livelihoods/work, psychological issues, different effects for different family members
Coping mechanisms including religion, kinship ties, community, migration, dealing with outside support/presence, issues of fairness, jealousy, understanding of support procedures and methods
Positive deviance such as people who cope well and the reason for it
Community level including social changes, dealing with deaths, changes in dynamics (cohesion/tensions over accountability), community support and leadership, reciprocity and new challenges

Needs, risks and vulnerabilities
Items needed in the immediate aftermath of earthquake such as food items, cash, shelters, items of clothing, medicines, blankets, utensils, tools, etc. Access to these.
Services/services needed in the immediate aftermath of earthquake such as health service, communication service, information service (and priorities). Access to these.
Needs based on different age groups, personal/ community/needs for livelihoods, daily activities
Prioritizing who to help as family/community
Services, facilities, and goods considered essential to be protected such as land, house, road access, markets, etc.
Services, facilities, and goods considered at risk during disaster such as land, livelihood, house, road access, etc.
Segment of the community considered to be vulnerable to the impact of disaster such as the poor, elderly, toddler, children, pregnant mothers, girls, boys, etc.
Spaces for children

Demographic and context of host households
Host household’s family members’ demographic such as age, gender and education level
Sociocultural context of host households such as religion and ethnicity
Livelihood of host households including identifying family member who contribute to household’s income, the type of work, temporary or permanent work, etc.
Key assets of host households such as land, house, livestock, vehicles, electronics, etc.
Access to fundamental needs such as water, food, sanitation, electricity, etc.
Access to services such as health and education services as well as to market, including how far it is from host household’s house, transportation needed, road condition, etc.

Village/community context
Geographical location such as topography, remoteness, physical access, etc.
Size of community
Sociocultural aspects including religion, ethnicity, social organizations, social cohesion, etc.
Economical aspects such as main livelihoods, natural resources, condition of poverty
Power and authority including leaderships, conflict resolutions, etc.
Availability of public facilities including schools, health centres, electricity, etc.

Priorities and aspirations
Best form of future support including what would help (short and long term)
Lessons learned
Preparations for future possible disaster
Roles and responsibilities such as community vs outsiders, self-help vs needed support
Concerns

Experience of aid/relief
Own direct experience
Provisions made for family members
Aid received including source organizations/groups/individuals, type (incl. physical vs psychological), functionality
Quality of aid including expectations, acceptability, good/bad experience, timeliness/duration
Organization and distribution of aid including coordination, dissemination, duplication
Mechanisms incl. process, legibility/requirements
Initiatives done by individuals/groups/organizations
Things missing which would have helped

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Key actors of the earthquake aftermath including parties to share responsibility and/or blame and reasons for it
Information source including the first point of contact, source of information, mechanisms in place, sources to be trusted or not trusted
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Segment of the community considered to be vulnerable to the impact of disaster such as the poor, elderly, toddler, children, pregnant mothers, girls, boys, etc.
Spaces for children
This Reality Check Approach (RCA) Insights study was carried out in May 2017. The study was intended to gather retrospective insights from people in the greater Yogyakarta area on their perspectives and experiences of the post-earthquake relief effort after the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake. The RCA Insights study is a component of a Needs Analysis to inform the development of a contingency plan on disaster preparedness in Indonesia, led by the Indonesia Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). The study provides people-centered perspectives and experiences on post-disaster relief. UNICEF – as a research partner – requested the support of the RCA+ team on behalf of the HCT.

www.reality-check-approach.com